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1 Introduction
City size distribution follows a robust regular pattern. Zipfs law claims that the population
size of a city is inversely proportional to its rank: the second largest city in a country is
about a half the size of the largest city, the third largest city is about a third the size of the
largest city, and so forth. Zipfs law has repeatedly been shown to hold in the top tails of
city size distribution across di¤erent countries and periods (e.g., Rosen and Resnick, 1980;
Dobkins and Ioannides, 2001; Ioannides and Overman, 2003; Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004;
Soo, 2005).
This paper proposes a new explanation for this empirical regularity, i.e. Zipfs law in the
top tail of city size distribution. Our model assumes that numerous random factors a¤ect
city size (e.g., industry composition, road networks, climates, geographic constraints such
as mountains and waters, human capital, zoning restriction, etc.), and predicts city size as
a product of these factors. We prove that the city size distribution converges to the log-
normal distribution by applying the central limit theorem (after a log transformation). The
log-normal distribution is, as shown in Eeckhout (2004) and Eeckhout (2009), consistent
with Zipfs law in the top tail. Since modern central limit theorems require only weak
conditions, our result applies quite generally; the random factors need not follow any specic
distribution, di¤erent random factors can come from di¤erent distributions, and the factors
may be correlated with each other to some degree.
Outside the top tail there is ongoing debate over what distribution best describes the city
size distribution. Eeckhout (2004) argues that the city size distribution for all cities follows
the log-normal distribution. Rozenfeld, Rybski, Gabaix and Makse (forthcoming) argue that
Zipfs law holds for cities greater over 12,000 population size. Our model generates the log-
normal distribution as Eeckhout (2004). However, given the current debate over the city size
distribution for all cities, we focus on Zipfs law in the top tail which has repeatedly been
conrmed in the literature.
A number of other explanations have been proposed to explain the empirical city size
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distribution. The workhorse in this literature is the dynamic random growth process!(e.g.,
Simon, 1955; Gabaix, 1999; Eeckhout, 2004; Duranton, 2006, 2007; Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright, 2007; Córdoba, 2008); if the growth rate of a city is independent of its size (i.e.,
Gibrats law holds), city size distribution converges to the log-normal distribution or the
Zipf distribution with additional conditions.1 Two static models have been o¤ered as well:
Hsu (2009) uses the central place theory and Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010)
use human capital distribution across cities.
Our model is a static version of the random growth models. The random shocks are
aggregated in the cross section instead of time. However, being a static model yields unique
interpretations and implications. First, the random shocks in our model represent di¤erent
factors a¤ecting city size, and we show that Zipfs law may emerge from the interaction of
the multiple factors even when each factor does not follow the Zipf distribution. This leads
to an important message: one cannot use Zipfs law to test a model of cities.2 Classical
urban economics models such as Henderson (1974) have sometimes been criticized because
they do not generate Zipfs law (e.g., Krugman, 1996; Gabaix, 1999). However, a typical
economic model focuses on one economic force it aims to deliver. A single model alone may
not generate Zipfs law, but when we have many such models together as in reality, Zipfs
1Simon (1955) proposes a random growth mechanism to explain the Pareto distribution in city size
distribution. Gabaix (1999) shows that Gibrats law (i.e., the growth rate of a city being independent of its
size) with a lower bound on city size can lead to Zipfs law (i.e., Pareto distribution with coe¢ cient 1) in
the steady state. Eeckhout (2004) argues that the city size distribution for all cities follows the log-normal
distribution and provides an economic model that generates it. Duranton (2006) provides an economic
foundation to Simon (1955) using the endogenous growth model with product proliferation developed by
Romer (1990). Duranton (2007) uses small industry-level shocks to explain fast changes in industry location,
slow changes in a citys relative ranking in population, and very stable city size distribution. Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright (2007) propose a dynamic model with endogenous city formation. Their model can generate not
only Zipfs law but also often-observed deviations. Córdoba (2008) translates the Gibrats law into more
economically meaningful restrictions about preferences, technologies, and the dynamic shocks.
2We thank Gilles Duranton for guiding us to this implication.
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law may emerge.
Second, our theory does not require Gibrats law. Instead, our theory requires that city
size can be expressed as a product of multiple factors. This puts a restriction on the shape
of city production function as Gibrats law in the random growth models puts a restriction
on the dynamic growth pattern across cities. A product, as compared to a sum, implies that
there is complementarity among the factors. In order for a city to become large, it has to
do well overall. If a city fails in one factor (e.g., climate), it can severely limit city size.
In addition to the complementarity among the factors, our theory requires that city size
is determined by numerous small factors in order to apply the central limit theorem. If city
size is determined by only a few dominant factors, our theory may not work. We examine
this issue by running a simulation. The result suggests that Zipfs Law can emerge in the
top tail even when there is only a small number of factors.
Our model also di¤ers from other urban economics models in that we assume di¤erent
cities are endowed with exogenously di¤erent physical attributes such as rivers and climate.
We use them as a subset of the random factors a¤ecting city size. The other models assume
that all locations are ex-ante identical and endogenously generate city size distribution.
The approach of using heterogenous natural features to explain the empirical city size
distribution was rst suggested by Krugman (1996). Our model develops the idea in the
following ways. First, we provide an explicit economic model. Second, our model extends
the randomness beyond just natural features, to include randomness in other man-made
features such as industry composition, road networks; the randomness in these features can
happen due to the randomness in policy making, big rmslocation decisions, etc.
Even though the heterogenous features alone can generate the di¤erences in city size,
it is unquestionable that the agglomeration economies also play a major role in shaping
city size distribution. Our model allows the agglomeration economies in each factor. The
agglomeration economies amplify city size di¤erences initiated by the heterogeneous features
across cities.
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The Zipf coe¢ cient roughly measures the degree of concentration of population among
cities (see section 4 for the denition of the Zipf coe¢ cient). The more concentrated the
population distribution becomes, the smaller the Zipf coe¢ cient becomes. Since the ag-
glomeration economies amplify city size di¤erences by making big cities even bigger, greater
agglomeration economies lead to a lower Zipf coe¢ cient. Dobkins and Ioannides (2001) nd
that the Zipf coe¢ cient for the U.S. declines from 1.044 in 1900 to .949 to 1990. One inter-
pretation based on our model is that agglomeration economies became more important over
this period.
Our model also generates implications that one can test against other types of models.
First, against the random growth models, our model predicts that each city has a stable
unique equilibrium city size. Thus, in response to a temporary shock, city size tends to go
back to the original equilibrium size. On the other hand, the random growth models predict
that each shock has permanent e¤ect on city size and thus city size does not have a tendency
to go back to the original size. Second, against the models relying only on agglomeration
economies assuming ex-ante identical features across cities, our model predicts substantial
city size variation even in a period when agglomeration economies play little role. Third,
against the models relying only on exogenous heterogeneous features, our model predicts
that population distribution will become more concentrated into larger cities in the period
when agglomeration economies become more important.
Davis and Weinstein (2002) test these implications. They study the distribution of re-
gional population in Japan from Stone Age to the modern era and obtain the following
results. First, after the extensive bombing over Japanese cities during World War II, includ-
ing two nuclear attacks, most cities returned to their relative position in the distribution of
city sizes within about 15 years. This conrms our rst implication. Second, throughout his-
tory there has always been a great deal of variation in population density across regions, even
in the Stone Age when agglomeration economies would not seem to have played an impor-
tant role. This conrms our second implication. Third, the population distribution became
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more concentrated into larger cities in the last century when agglomeration economies be-
came more important as Japan became industrialized and more integrated into the world
economy. This conrms our third implication. Based on these ndings, Davis and Weinstein
(2002) advocate for a hybrid model of agglomeration economies and heterogeneous natural
features. Our model is the rst one in this direction.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the base model. Section
3 shows that our model generates the log-normal distribution. Section 4 shows that our
model is consistent with Zipfs law in the top tail. Section 5 concludes.
2 Base Model
The key idea of this paper is that the city size distribution can generate Zipfs law in the
top tail if city size can be expressed as a product of numerous random factors. This section
provides an underlying model to support this idea. The model starts from Roback (1982).
The Roback model predicts the wage and rent of a city as a function of its local production
amenities and consumption amenities. In order to transform the Roback model into a model
of city size distribution, we make two changes. First, we add a housing market and this
works as the main congestion force pinning down the population size of a city. Second, we
allow local production and consumption amenities to depend on population size to capture
the agglomeration economies. As the result, the model predicts city size as an increasing
function of production amenities, consumption amenities and land supply.
2.1 Description
A continuum of potential city sites are indexed by s 2 [0; 1]. The locations di¤er exogenously
in three groups of characteristics: natural consumption amenities a 2RJ , natural production
amenities o 2RK , and physical land supply factors l 2RM . These natural features capture
rivers, mountains, climate, coastal locations, etc. The locations di¤er endogenously in ag-
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gregate consumption amenities A2R, aggregate production amenities O2R, aggregate land
supply L2R as well as population size N , wage w, and rent r. These endogenous features
encompass the e¤ects of man-made facilities such as restaurants, high ways, zoning restric-
tions as well as the natural amenities. Note that a, o, l are vectors but A;O;L are scalars
capturing the aggregate e¤ects. The local consumption amenities A, production amenities
O, and land supply L all depend on the natural features a;o and l as well as population size
N :
A = A(N; a);
O = O(N;o);
L = L(N; l):
There are two commodities: a composite good and housing. The composite good is freely
tradable with zero transportation cost while housing is locally provided. The markets for
both goods are perfectly competitive.
N workers live in the economy. All workers are homogeneous and freely mobile with
zero moving cost. A worker rst chooses a city to live in and then chooses her consumption
bundle consisting of the composite good q and housing h. The utility function U(q; h;A)
is increasing in the consumption amenities A. Each worker supplies one unit of labor. The
decision of a worker can be summarized by the following maximization problem:
max
s
V (rs; ws;As)
where
V (rs; ws;As)  max
q;h
U(q; h;As) subject to q + rsh = ws.
where rs, ws, and As are housing rent, wage, and consumption amenities in city s. We use
the composite good as the numeraire.
Each city has numerous rms producing the composite good. All rms use the same
constant-returns-to-scale technology and thus we can consider one aggregate rm for each
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city, which behaves like a perfectly competitive rm. The aggregate rm uses labor n and
buildings which we assume come from the same stock of housing as workershousing h. The
production function F is increasing in the production amenities O. The decision of a rm
in city s can be summarized by the following maximization problem:
max
n;h
F (n; h;Os)  wsn  rsh
where n and h are labor and housing input.
All housing is owned by absentee landlords. Instead of explicitly modeling housing devel-
opers, we assume for simplicity that housing supply is a function of rent r and land supply
L:
HS (r;L) :
2.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model fS; u;ws; rs; Nsjs 2 Sg consists of the set of populated sites
S, equilibrium utility level u, and wage ws, rent rs, population size Ns for each city s 2
S, satisfying the following ve conditions. First, workers get the same utility across all
populated locations:
(1) V (rs; ws;A (Ns; as)) = u for s 2 S
where u is the common utility level and S is the set of locations with positive population
size (S  fsjNs > 0g).
Second, rms that produce the composite good earn zero prots. Since the rms use
constant returns to scale technology, the zero prot condition is equivalent to the unit cost
being equal to the unit output price:
(2) C(rs; ws;O (Ns;os)) = 1 for s 2 S
where C is the unit cost function.
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Third, the housing market in each city clears:
(3) HD(Ns; rs; ws;A (Ns; as) ; O (Ns;os)) = HS(rs;L (Ns; ls)) for s 2 S
where HD is the aggregate housing demand function of workers and rms.
Fourth, economy-wide labor market clears:
(4)
Z
S
Nsds = N:
Fifth, unpopulated sites o¤er lower utility than the common utility level u:
(5) V (rs; ws;A (0; as))  u for s 62 S.
Equations (1) to (3) determine wage ws, housing rent rs and population size Ns for each
city s 2 S, when the common utility level u and the set of populated sites S are given.
Equation (4) determines the common utility level u given the set of populated sites S, since
Ns is a function of u. Equation (5) characterizes the set of populated sites S.
3 Log-Normal Distribution
We obtain the key result by imposing specic functional forms. First, we use the following
functional forms for workerspreference, rmsproduction technology, and housing supply.
(6)
Preference: U(q; h;A) = A  qh1 
Production technology: F (n; h;O) = O  nh1 
Housing supply: Hs (r;L) = L  r
where ;  2 (0; 1) and  > 0. These functional forms are quite standard and also have
some empirical support. For example, Davis and Ortalo-Magne (forthcoming) show that
the income elasticity of housing consumption is 1. The Cobb-Douglas function is arguably
the most common production function in economics. The housing supply function can be
motivated by the following story. Imagine a city located on a coast so can expand only in
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180 degrees. Its land supply L would be a half as large as that of a city that can expand in
360 degrees.
Second, we assume that consumption amenities As, production amenities Os and land
supply Ls can be expressed as the product of multiple underlying factors:
(7) As =
JY
j=1
Aj;s, Os =
KY
k=1
Ok;s, Ls =
MY
m=1
Lm;s;
where
(8)
Aj;s = aj;sN
j
s ;
Ok;s = ok;sN
k
s ;
Lm;s = lm;sN
m
s :
Each factor Aj;s, Ok;s, Lm;s consists of exogenous features aj;s, ok;s, lm;s and agglomeration
economy terms Njs ; N
k
s N ms . The agglomeration economy parameters j, k, m can di¤er
across di¤erent factors.
With these functional forms, we derive our theoretical results. We rst show that the
equilibrium population size of each city is unique and stable. This result relates to the
natural experiment Davis and Weinstein (2002) studied. Suppose that S and u are xed.
Using equations (2) and (3), we can solve for wage ws and rent rs as the functions of Ns.
By substituting these into ws and rs in the indirect utility function V we can express the
indirect utility function in terms of only population size N . (See Appendix A for details.)
(9) ~Vs (N) = 

1
N
 1 

A
(
JY
j=1
(aj;s)
A
KY
k=1
(ok;s)
O
MY
m=1
lm;s
) 1
A
where A;O, and  are positive constants and 
  A
PJ
j=1 j +O
PK
k=1 k +
PM
m=1 m
is the aggregate agglomeration economy parameter.3 This indirect utility function ~Vs (N)
is the utility city s o¤ers when its population size is N . Equilibrium population size Ns is
determined by the remaining equation (1):
(10) ~Vs (Ns) = u.
3A =
1+
1  ;O =
+
1  ; = (1  )1 (1  ) 
( 1+)(+)
1+ (1  ) 1+1+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Suppose that 
 < 1. It is clear from equation (9) that ~Vs (N) is continuous and strictly
decreasing inN with limN!0 ~Vs (N) =1 and limN!1 ~Vs (N) = 0: Thus, there exists a unique
Ns satisfying equation (10) for any positive u by the intermediate value theorem. In addition,
this population size Ns is stable in Krugman (1991) sense. For example, suppose that a
negative temporary shock hits a city s and its population size decreases below equilibrium
city size Ns. With a smaller population size, the utility the city o¤ers is greater than the
common utility level u and thus its population size increases back to equilibrium size Ns.
Note that if 
 > 1, equilibrium city size becomes unstable (i.e., ~Vs (N) is increasing in N)
and this can lead to a black-hole equilibrium where all people go to only one city.
The intuition behind this stability result is the following. As city size decreases, housing
price decreases allowing the city to o¤er higher utility. However, the downside of losing
population is the loss in the agglomeration economies in consumption amenities, production
amenities, and land supply. If the agglomeration economy parameter 
 is less than 1, the
housing e¤ect dominates so the city o¤ers better utility with a smaller population size and
this makes equilibrium city size stable. On the other hand, if 
 is greater than 1, the
agglomeration e¤ect dominates so a city o¤ers better utility with a larger population size.
This makes the equilibrium city size unstable and can lead to the black-hole equilibrium.
By solving equation (10), we obtain equilibrium population size Ns:
(11) Ns =
(

u
A JY
j=1
(aj;s)
A
KY
k=1
(ok;s)
O
MY
m=1
lm;s
) 1
1 

:
Equilibrium population size Ns is strictly increasing in production amenities aj;s, consump-
tion amenities ok;s, and supply factors lm;s and strictly decreasing in the common utility level
u.
So far we have taken equilibrium utility level u and the set of populated sites S as given.
Equilibrium utility level u is unique given the set of populated sites S. This follows from
equation (4) because the population size of each city is continuous and strictly decreasing
in u with limu!0Ns (u) = 1 and limu!1Ns (u) = 0 as can be seen in equation (11) : The
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intermediate value theorem implies that equation (4) is satised for only one value of u. The
set of populated sites S is equal to the set of all locations [0; 1] because the indirect utility
limN!0 ~Vs (N) =1 and zero population size is not stable.4
Proposition 1 Suppose that 
 < 1.
(a) The population size of each city is unique and stable.
(b) Population size Ns of city s is increasing in consumption amenity factor aj;s, production
amenity factor ok;s, and land supply factor lm;s (j 2 J; k 2 K, m 2M).
Now we derive our key result that if the exogenous factors aj, ok, and lm are randomly
distributed, population size N converges in distribution to the log-normal distribution as
the number of these factors increases. We interpret aj;s,ok;s, and lm;s as the realizations of
random variables aj, ok, and lm so we do not show the city index s any more. Taking log
transformation of equation (11) we obtain
(12) logN =
1
1  

(
JX
j=1
A log aj +
KX
k=1
O log ok +
MX
m=1
log lm + A log


u
)
Mathematically A log aj; O log ok, and log lm play the same roles. In order to simplify
notations we introduce new symbol Xi which we use for all the three types. We can reorder
the attribute terms
(A log a1; :::;A log aJ ;O log o1; :::;O log oK ; log l1; :::; log lM)
as we like and assign X1; :::; XI where I  J +K +M . We rewrite equation (12) using the
new notations as
logN I =
1
1  

(
IX
i=1
Xi + A log


u
)
(13)
=
1
1  

(
IX
i=1
X^i +
IX
i=1
Xi + A log


u
)
(14)
4This is a undesirable feature coming from the functional forms we use. We can x this by tweaking the
agglomeration economies for small cities or by introducing xed cost to develop a city that has to be paid
by the absentee landlords. However, this x would come at the cost of making the model more complicated
and less focused.
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where Xi  E (Xi), and X^i  Xi   Xi: Note that E

X^i

= 0. In order to show that
city size distribution converges to log-normal distribution, it su¢ ces to show that
PI
i=1 X^i
in equation (14) converges to normal distribution as I increases. We obtain this result by
applying the central limit theorem to
PI
i=1 X^i.
The classical central limit theorem states that
PI
i=1 X^i converges in distribution to normal
distribution if X^is are independent and identically distributed. Since this requirement is too
restrictive for our purpose, we use a version of modern central limit theorem which relaxes
these requirements. This version allows di¤erent random variables X^i to come from di¤erent
distributions and also allows correlation among the variables to some degree. Kourogenis
and Pittis (2008) provide an excellent survey of modern central limit theorems. The version
we use corresponds to Theorem 4 in Kourogenis and Pittis (2008) which in turn is based on
Corollary 1 in Herrndorf (1984). We begin by describing the allowable correlation structure
among the random variables using  mixing.
Denition 2 For a sequence X^1; X^2; ::: of random variables, let i be a number such that
jP (A \B)  P (A)P (B)j  i for A 2 (X^1; :::; X^n) and B 2 (X^n+i; X^n+i+1; :::)
where (X) is dened as the -eld generated by X. If i ! 0 as i ! 1, the sequence
X^1; X^2; ::: is said to be -mixing.
If a sequence
n
X^i; i 2 N
o
is  mixing, ~Xn and ~Xn+i becomes approximately independent
as i increases to innity. How much they are correlated with each other depends on how fast
i converges to 0 as i increases. Now we state the central limit theorem.
Theorem 3 (Herrndorf (1984)) Let
n
X^i; i 2 N
o
be an -mixing sequence of random vari-
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ables satisfying the following conditions.
1) E

X^i

= 0
2) lim
i!1
E(
S2i
i
) = 2; 0 < 2 <1
3) sup
i2N
E
X^ib < 1 for some b > 2
4)
1X
i=1
(i)
1  2
b < 1
where Si 
Pi
j=1 X^j: Then
1

p
i
Si converges in distribution to the standard normal distribu-
tion N (0; 1) :
Since we construct X^i so that E

X^i

= 0, the rst condition is satised. The second
condition means that the variances of the partial sum behaves nicely. The third condition
requires that the moments of order b > 2 to be uniformly bounded. The fourth condition
puts restriction on the  mixing rate. The third and the fourth conditions are linked by
b. As b increases, the third condition becomes harder to satisfy and the fourth condition
becomes easier to satisfy. By applying Theorem 3 we obtain our main result.
Proposition 4 If the sequence X^1; X^2; ::: satises the conditions listed in Theorem 3, the
city size distribution converges in distribution to log normal distribution. Asymptotically,
city size N I with I random factors follows logN

1
1 

nPI
i=1
Xi + A log
 

u
o
; 
2I
(1 
)2

.
4 Zipfs Law
This section shows the relationship between our model and Zipfs law. Zipfs law emerges
when city size follows Pareto distribution with the shape parameter 1. Suppose that city
size N follows Pareto distribution with scale parameter eN and shape parameter :
CDF (N) = 1 
 eN
N
!
.
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When there are M cities in total, the rank Rs of city s with population size Ns can be
approximated as
Rs M (1  CDF (Ns)) =M
 eN
Ns
!
:
When  = 1, we obtain Zipfs law:
Ns  1
Rs
M eN:
In other words, the population size of a city is inversely proportional to its rank.
Typically, the parameters are estimated by the Zipf regression:
(15) logRs = C    logNs
where C is a constant term. Due to data availability most empirical studies use only the
largest cities in a country to estimate the Zipf coe¢ cient  and nd that Zipfs law holds
well in the top tail (e.g., Rosen and Resnick, 1980; Dobkins and Ioannides, 2001; Soo, 2005).
Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) survey the literature and report that most estimates of the
Zipf coe¢ cient  fall into [0:8; 1:2].
For the whole distribution including bottom tail there is ongoing debate over what dis-
tribution best describes the city size distribution. The issue is that population size for cities
in the bottom tail are usually not available. Rozenfeld et al. (forthcoming) use their own
algorithm (City Clustering Algorithm) to construct cities from US Census tracts population
distribution and nd that Zipfs law holds for cities larger than 12,000 inhabitants in the
US. Eeckhout (2004) uses US Census places to look at small cities and nds that the size
distribution for all cities follows the log-normal distribution. He also argues that the log-
normal distribution is hardly distinguishable from Pareto distribution in top tail and thus
approximately consistent with Zipfs law in top tail. Ioannides and Skouras (2009) uses data
in Eeckhout (2004) and argue that there is a switch from log-normal distribution to Pareto
distribution around population size of 100,000.
Our model generates log-normal distribution asymptotically and thus, as in Eeckhout
(2004), consistent with Zipfs law in top tail. However, this argument may not work if city
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size is determined by a small number of dominant factors or the random factors are too much
correlated with each other. We examine this issue as follows. First, we prove analytically
that our model can generate the Zipf coe¢ cient equal to 1 by adjusting model parameters,
regardless of the number of factors or the degree of correlation. Second, we calculate R2
in the Zipf regression for simulated samples with di¤erent number of factors and di¤erent
degree of correlation. The R2 shows how well our model can generate the linear relationship
implied by Pareto distribution between log rank and log city size.
Using equations (13) and (15) we can express the Zipf coe¢ cient as
 =  Cov (logN; logR)
V ar (logN)
= (1  
)
 Cov
PI
i=1Xi; logR

V ar
PI
i=1Xi
 :
Thus, the Zipf coe¢ cient  depends on agglomeration economy parameter 
, distribution
of random shocks fXig, and the number of random shocks I. Since Cov
PI
i=1Xi; logR

is
negative, we obtain the following results immediately.
Proposition 5 1. Zipf coe¢ cient  is proportional to 1  
, thus decreasing in 
.
2. Suppose that we rescale the random shock distribution so that X 0 = 'X and use X 0
to calculate the Zipf coe¢ cient. The Zipf coe¢ cient  is inversely proportional to ', thus
decreasing in '.
Proposition 5.1 links agglomeration economies to the Zipf coe¢ cient. This result is in-
tuitive. A smaller Zipf coe¢ cient means that city size distribution is more uneven; larger
agglomeration economies make big cities even bigger creating more uneven city size distrib-
ution. Dobkins and Ioannides (2001) show that the Zipf coe¢ cient for the U.S. has declined
in the twentieth century. One explanation based on our model is that the agglomeration
economies became more important over this period.
Proposition 5.1 suggests that we can always match the Zipf coe¢ cient equal to 1 by
adjusting 
 or by rescaling the random shock distribution. Note that this result does not
depend on the number of factors or the degree of correlation. Gabaix and Ioannides (2004)
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show that the OLS estimate of  is downward biased in a small sample and provide the
magnitude of the bias for various sample sizes. This is not a problem for us because we can
match the Zipf coe¢ cient with the bias taken into account.
Now we examine the goodness of t R2 by running a simulation. We proceed as follows.
We x the number of factors and the degree of correlation among the factors, generate 25,000
city sizes using our model, truncate the distribution to include only top 135 cities and run
the Zipf regression.5 We repeat this 2,000 times and report average R2 and its standard
deviation. We vary the number of factors and the degree of correlation and repeat the whole
process.
We use the following process to generate random factors Xis.
X1 = "1.
Xi+1 = Xi + (1  ) "i+1
where "i follows iid Uniform distribution [0; 1].  captures the degree of correlation: all
factors are perfectly correlated if  = 1 and are independent if  = 0. We do not report 
,
A,  and u because these parameters do not a¤ect R2 once the random factors Xis are
determined. In order to see this, we obtain the following equation by inserting logN I in
equation (13) into equation (15):
logRj = C     1
1  

(
IX
i=1
Xji + A log


u
)
It is clear from this equation that changes in these parameters are fully absorbed by changes
in ^ and C^ and thus do not a¤ect predicted log rank and thus R2. By the same reason
rescaling the random shock distribution does not a¤ect R2 either.
The simulation result in Table 1 shows that our simulated distribution quickly converges
close to Pareto distribution in the top tail. When the factors are independent ( = 0),
5We use 25,000 clusters because this is close to the numbers of places (25,359) in Eeckhout (2004) and
clusters (23,499) in Rozenfeld et al. (forthcoming). We truncate them at the top 135 cities because this is
the threshold repeatedly used in the literature.
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Table 1: Average R2s from the Zipf regressions on simulated samples
# of Factors =0 =0.5 =0.9 =1
1 0.790 (0.030) 0.791 (0.029) 0.789 (0.030) 0.790 (0.029)
2 0.917 (0.022) 0.917 (0.022) 0.916 (0.022) 0.789 (0.030)
3 0.955 (0.017) 0.955 (0.018) 0.955 (0.018) 0.791 (0.030)
4 0.970 (0.016) 0.970 (0.015) 0.965 (0.016) 0.790 (0.029)
5 0.977 (0.013) 0.976 (0.014) 0.971 (0.015) 0.791 (0.029)
6 0.980 (0.012) 0.980 (0.012) 0.974 (0.014) 0.789 (0.029)
7 0.982 (0.011) 0.982 (0.011) 0.976 (0.014) 0.791 (0.029)
8 0.983 (0.011) 0.982 (0.011) 0.978 (0.013) 0.791 (0.028)
9 0.983 (0.011) 0.983 (0.011) 0.978 (0.013) 0.790 (0.029)
10 0.983 (0.010) 0.983 (0.010) 0.980 (0.013) 0.791 (0.029)
average R2 becomes greater than .98 around 6 factors. When the factors are correlated
(but not perfectly correlated), our simulated distribution still quickly converges to Pareto
distribution. For example, when  = 0:9, average R2 becomes greater than .98 around 10
factors. The .98 is the benchmark R2 we obtain by running the same simulation but using
the Pareto distribution for city size.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new explanation for the robust empirical pattern in city size distribu-
tion: if city size is determined as a product of numerous factors, this may generate Zipfs law
in the top tail. The key implication of our theory is that we cannot reject a model simply
because the model does not generate Zipfs law. A typical economic model focuses on one
economic force it aims to deliver, abstracting away the other forces existing in reality. Our
theory demonstrates that one single model may not generate Zipfs law but Zipfs law may
18
emerge if we have many such models together as in reality.
A How to Obtain ~Vs (N)
Using the functional specications in equations (6) to (8) we can rewrite the equilibrium
conditions (1) to (3) as
V (r; w;As) = As
(1  )1 wr (1 ) = u;(16)
C(r; w;Os) = (Os)
 1  (1  ) (1 )wr1  = 1;(17)
HD(Ns; r; w;As; Os)  Ns1  

w
r
= Lr  HS(r;Ls):(18)
Note that housing is demanded by both workers and rms.
Dene as =
JQ
j=1
aj;s; os =
KQ
k=1
ok;s; ls =
MQ
m=1
lm;s;  =
PJ
j=1 j;  =
PK
k=1 k; and  =PM
m=1 m: From Equation (17) and Equation (18), we can solve r and w in terms of popu-
lation N as follows
rs =
h
(1  )1 (1  )os (ls)  (Ns)+(1 )
i 1
1+
;
ws = (1  )
(1+)(1 )
1+ (1  )  1 1+ (os)
1+
1+ (ls)
1 
1+ (Ns)
(1+) (1 )(1 )
1+ :
Substitute the above into the expression for the indirect utility in Equation (16), we get
~Vs(N) = 

1
N
 1 

A
h
(as)
A (os)
O ls
i 1
A ;
where  = (1  )1 (1  )  1A (1  )(1 )
O
A ;
 =  + A+ O;A =
1+
1  ; and
O =
+
1  :
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